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Twitter Blames Epic Hack on 'Phone Spear Phishing' Scheme That Duped Employees

The term spear phishing means the hackers researched their targets, and then came up with a ploy to manipulate them into giving up login credentials for Twitter’s systems.

 & Michael Kan Principal Reporter

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The culprits who pulled off this month’s epic hack on Twitter were apparently using phone calls to trick company employees into giving up their passwords. 

On Thursday, the company provided an update on the July 15 incident, which enabled the attackers to hijack dozens of Twitter accounts belonging to various celebrities. A key mystery has been how the hackers broke into the company’s internal systems to instigate the account takeovers.  

Twitter is now blaming the intrusion on a “phone spear phishing” attack against a small number of employees who fell for the stunt. The company hasn’t elaborated, but the term spear phishing means the hackers researched their targets, and then came up with a ploy to dupe them into giving up login credentials for Twitter’s systems. 

Most of the time, spear phishing attacks masquerade as emails that pretend to come from your email provider, company HR department or IT support desk. The message may even contain your name, title, and some personal details to convince you the correspondence is legit. The email can then trick you into opening up a malicious document or visiting a hacker-controlled login page that’ll secretly steal your passwords. 

The culprits behind the Twitter hack, however, decided to incorporate phone calls in their scheme. Security expert Graham Cluley laid out one possible scenario to how the ruse might have worked:

“A targeted Twitter employee or contractor received a message on their phones which appeared to be from Twitter’s support team, and asked them to call a number,” he wrote in a blog post. “When the worker called the number they might have been taken to a convincing (but fake) helpdesk operator, who was then able to use social engineering techniques to trick the intended victim into handing over their credentials.”

Using the phone calls would’ve also made it easier for the culprits to establish trust with the company employees, Cluley points out. “Equally the conversation could be initiated by a scammer calling the employee, perhaps using a VoIP phone service and using caller ID spoofing to pretend to be ringing from a legitimate number,” he added. 

Although Twitter isn’t elaborating on the spear phishing scheme, the company is indicating the culprits successfully phished one employee, which gave them an entry way into Twitter's internal system. The attackers then learned about the company's processes to find other staff members who had direct access to Twitter’s account management tools. 

"This attack relied on a significant and concerted attempt to mislead certain employees and exploit human vulnerabilities to gain access to our internal systems,” the company said. In total, the hackers targeted 130 Twitter accounts on July 15, but hijacked only 45 of them. Another 36 accounts had the inbox to their direct messages accessed

Last week, Reuters reported that over 1,000 Twitter employees and contractors had access to internal systems with the power to initiate account takeovers. However, Twitter claims the company has strict processes in place to prevent abuse, even though the breach this month suggests otherwise.

“We have zero tolerance for misuse of credentials or tools, actively monitor for misuse, regularly audit permissions, and take immediate action if anyone accesses account information without a valid business reason,” the company said yesterday. “While these tools, controls, and processes are constantly being updated and improved, we are taking a hard look at how we can make them even more sophisticated.”

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About Our Expert

Michael Kan

Michael Kan

Principal Reporter

My Experience

I've been a journalist for over 15 years. I got my start as a schools and cities reporter in Kansas City and joined PCMag in 2017, where I cover satellite internet services, cybersecurity, PC hardware, and more. I'm currently based in San Francisco, but previously spent over five years in China, covering the country's technology sector.

Since 2020, I've covered the launch and explosive growth of SpaceX's Starlink satellite internet service, writing 600+ stories on availability and feature launches, but also the regulatory battles over the expansion of satellite constellations, fights with rival providers like AST SpaceMobile and Amazon, and the effort to expand into satellite-based mobile service. I've combed through FCC filings for the latest news and driven to remote corners of California to test Starlink's cellular service.

I also cover cyber threats, from ransomware gangs to the emergence of AI-based malware. In 2024 and 2025, the FTC forced Avast to pay consumers $16.5 million for secretly harvesting and selling their personal information to third-party clients, as revealed in my joint investigation with Motherboard.

I also cover the PC graphics card market. Pandemic-era shortages led me to camp out in front of a Best Buy to get an RTX 3000. I'm now following how the AI-driven memory shortage is impacting the entire consumer electronics market. I'm always eager to learn more, so please jump in the comments with feedback and send me tips.

The Best Tech I've Had:

  • My first video game console: a Nintendo Famicom
  • I loved my Sega Saturn despite PlayStation's popularity.
  • The iPod Video I received as a gift in college
  • Xbox 360 FTW
  • The Galaxy Nexus was the first smartphone I was proud to own.
  • The PC desktop I built in 2013, which still works to this day.

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