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How the RSA SecurID Hack Worked

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Avivah Litan, an analyst at Gartner Research, revealed in a blog entry Friday that the recent hack of RSA's SecurID system was performed via the recently-revealed 0-Day bug in Adobe's Flash.

As Adobe stated at the time, the attack was performed by means of a Flash object embedded in an Excel (.XLS) file.

"RSA said the attack started with phishing emails sent to small groups of low-profile RSA users (presumably employees)," she wrote. "The emails were surreptitiously titled "2011 Recruitment Plan" and landed in the users' email Junk folders. (At least RSA's SPAM filters were working, even if their social engineering training for employees was not).

"Attached to the mysterious email was an Excel spreadsheet with recently-discovered Adobe Flash zero day flaw CVE 20110609. With the trojan downloaded, the attackers then started harvesting credentials and made their way up the RSA food chain via both IT and non-IT personnel accounts, until they finally obtained privileged access to the targeted system," Litan added. "The targeted data and files were stolen, and sent to an external compromised machine at a hosting provider. RSA saw the attack, using its implementation of NetWitness, and stopped the attack before more damage could be done."

The revelation of an attack on RSA 2 weeks ago provided few details of the attack, but identified the target as the SecurID and indicated that some attacks against it could be eased owing to the breach.

Litan praises RSA's relative openness and the speed with which they disclosed the attack, but concludes that it doesn't speak well of their internal security. The company sells products which are designed to detect attacks such as these, but either they weren't in use internally or—worse—they were and whiffed.

Adobe has since patched the 0-day bug and Microsoft has documented how to stop Office apps from supporting embedded ActiveX objects.

Originally posted to the PCMag.com security blog, Security Watch. This post was edited and supplemented to by Mark Hachman.

About Our Expert

Larry Seltzer

Larry Seltzer

Larry Seltzer has been writing software for and English about computers ever since—much to his own amazement—he graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1983.

He was one of the authors of NPL and NPL-R, fourth-generation languages for microcomputers by the now-defunct DeskTop Software Corporation. (Larry is sad to find absolutely no hits on any of these +products on Google.) His work at Desktop Software included programming the UCSD p-System, a virtual machine-based operating system with portable binaries that pre-dated Java by more than 10 years.

For several years, he wrote corporate software for Mathematica Policy Research (they're still in business!) and Chase Econometrics (not so lucky) before being forcibly thrown into the consulting market. He bummed around the Philadelphia consulting and contract-programming scenes for a year or two before taking a job at NSTL (National Software Testing Labs) developing product tests and managing contract testing for the computer industry, governments and publication.

In 1991 Larry moved to Massachusetts to become Technical Director of PC Week Labs (now eWeek Labs). He moved within Ziff Davis to New York in 1994 to run testing at Windows Sources. In 1995, he became Technical Director for Internet product testing at PC Magazine and stayed there till 1998.

Since then, he has been writing for numerous other publications, including Fortune Small Business, Windows 2000 Magazine (now Windows and .NET Magazine), ZDNet and Sam Whitmore's Media Survey.

He is co-author of Linksys Networks: The Official Guide, author of ADMIN911: Windows 2000 Terminal Services and Webmaster of ADMIN911 and CPA911.

Larry can be reached at larryseltzer@ziffdavis.com.

Check out Larry Seltzer's introductory column: Ziff Davis' Security Supersite: Blocking the Bad Guys

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